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Abstract
As a hub of finance, art, design and science, the city of London has long attracted migrants interested in study and ca-
reer opportunities or simply excited about living in an open, global city. Over the last few decades, it has also been a key
migration destination for Europeans originating from the Nordic countries. Based on survey data gathered through an
online questionnaire, this article focuses on Nordic migrants currently living in London. Since the June 2016 referendum,
the Brexit process has forced these voluntary and rather privileged migrants to question their inclusion in British society.
This article discusses the role of migrant capital, i.e., the skills and resources created as a result of migration, at a time of
uncertainty brought on by Brexit. It examines how these migrants see their position within the social hierarchy of the city
and its job market, as well as within the local and transnational networks they maintain to their countries of origin. Their
Nordic background is valuable thanks to the cultural capital embodied in their habitus as well as the social capital available
via the Nordic networks in UK and transnationally.
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1. Introduction
London has long been Europe’s main global city and the
driver of British economic growth with a steady demand
for migrant labour at all skill levels (e.g., Favell, 2008;
Talani, 2018). As a city boasting numerous job opportuni-
ties in finance, tourism, advertising, law, art, design, con-
sultancy and research, it has also been one of the key
destinations for intra-European migrants. This article dis-
cusses the role of migrant capital, i.e., the skills and re-
sources created as a result of migration, in the lives of
Nordic migrants living in London under the uncertainty
caused by the Brexit referendum of 2016. An estimated
91,000 people born in one of the five Nordic countries
(Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) cur-
rently live in the UK (Office for National Statistics, 2019a).
Thanks to the victory of the “Leave” campaign in the
June 2016 referendum on the British membership of the
EU, the position of London as the migration destination
of Europe is changing. While the timetable and manner
of the UK’s break away from the European Union (EU)
is still unclear three years after the referendum, the ef-
fects of the decision are already visible, for example, in
migration statistics. In the last few years, theUK has been
the destination ofmore than 600,000migrants each year,
while the numbers of people emigrating from the coun-
try have remained at around 350,000 per year. This has
signified a net immigration rate of 200,000 to 300,000
migrants per year. The proportion of migrants originat-
ing from within the EU is decreasing while the number
of non-EU arrivals has been rising. EU long-term immigra-
tion figures have fallen since 2016, and in 2018 the num-
ber of new arrivals was at its lowest since 2013 (Office
for National Statistics, 2019b). However, in light of the
national statistics of each of the Nordic countries, the
popularity of the UK as a migration destination has re-
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mained quite steady for Nordic migrants. In 2018, for ex-
ample, more than 6,000 Nordic citizens migrated to the
UK (Figure 1).
London is an exciting global city that offers the
promise of self-discovery via living in a trulymulticultural
metropolis. For many intra-European migrants, a move
to London has been a chance to experience a sense of
denationalised freedom (Favell, 2008). However, the un-
certainty brought on by the prolonged Brexit process has
had an impact on the migrants’ lives at multiple levels:
for their legal status and rights as residents of the UK,
for their work opportunities and career prospects, and
for the sense of belonging and feeling of social inclusion
in British society. Cassidy, Innocenti, and Bürkner (2018)
note that in all of its complexity, the Brexit process has
forced both British and EU citizens to revise their every-
day sense of belonging. Migrant responses to the out-
come of the vote have ranged from initial feelings of
shock and panic, followed by pragmatic, adaptive strate-
gies to build a sense of security and continuity (Botterill,
McCollum, & Tyrrell, 2019). In their analysis of the situa-
tion, Guma and Dafydd Jones (2019) have examined how
Brexit affects EU migrants’ rights, settlement and sense
of identity and argue that Brexit should be understood
as an ongoing process of “othering” and “unsettling.” It
will thus influence the migrants’ social inclusion in the
UK, when it is understood as a synonym of terms such as
“unity, cohesion, civic engagement [and] togetherness”
(Koikkalainen, 2011, p. 454).
The aim of this article is to examine migrant capital
via the experiences of Nordic migrants who are contem-
plating their future as the parameters of belonging and
the rules regulating their rights in the UK are changing.
Patterns of migrant inclusion and exclusion are not sim-
ple processes but are highly differentiated and depend
on the features of individual migrants, on structural fac-
tors in the country of destination and are impacted by
changes in the policies of the country in question (e.g.,
Carmel & Cerami, 2011). For EU nationals living in the
UK, the Brexit process represents a rupture in time, an
exceptional period during which they have to reconsider
their personal lives, careers andmobility options. From a
temporal perspective, onemay hypothesise that this pro-
cess is different depending on how long one has lived in
the UK, how strong the ties one has formed there are, or
whether one remains mostly attached to one’s country
of origin. Do the ways in which one feels social inclusion
differ based on the length of stay in the country, and does
this matter for migrant capital?
The sections of the article that follow first discuss the
different forms of capital andmigration, present the data
andmethods used in this research and then examine cul-
tural and social capital as forms of migrant capital in the
case of Nordics living in London.
2. The Forms of Capital and Migration
In migration research, Pierre Bourdieu’s (1984, 1986)
concepts “field,” “habitus” and the different “types of
capital” have been used in at least two ways: first, to un-
derstand the problems of transferring education, skills
and expertise from one society or cultural environment
to another; and second, to describe the networks and
ties forged between different places as a result of migra-
tion (e.g., Erel, 2010; Erel & Ryan, 2019; Nowicka, 2013;
Ryan, 2011).
For Bourdieu, all differentiated societies consist of
fields or networks of relations that structure our so-
cial world: “The social cosmos is made up of a number
of such relatively autonomous social microcosms, i.e.,
spaces of objective relations” (Wacquant, 1989, p. 39).
These include the economic, artistic or religious field,
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Figure 1. Number of Nordic citizens moving to the UK according to the national statistics data of each sending country,
2010–2018. Sources: Statistics Denmark (2019), Statistics Finland (2019), Statistics Iceland (2019), Statistics Norway (2019),
and Statistics Sweden (2019).
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that each follows a particular logic of its own and is an
arena for struggles over the specific resources of that
field (Wacquant, 1989, pp. 39–40; see also Jenkins, 2002,
pp. 84–85).
Habitus refers to the outlook, habits and dispositions
embodied onto oneself during socialization; and con-
sists of “schemes of perception, thought, and action”
(Bourdieu, 1989, p. 14). It is relevant in the context of
migration because a change of cultural and spatial loca-
tion brings into view social conventions that are usually
taken for granted. As Bourdieu noted in an interviewwith
his colleague LoïcWacquant: “Andwhen habitus encoun-
ters a social world of which it is the product, it finds itself
‘as fish in water,’ it does not feel the weight of the water
and takes the world about itself for granted” (Wacquant,
1989, p. 43). The act of migration calls into question the
schemes one has learned to live by, as the “water” one
must swim in does not conform to one’s expectations.
Bourdieu also defined three types of capital: eco-
nomic, social and cultural. Economic capital refers to a
command over economic or monetary resources and so-
cial capital refers to resources based on membership of
certain networks or groups, such as influence and sup-
port. Cultural capital refers to skills and knowledge ac-
quired through education and through the socialisation
process (Bourdieu, 1986, pp. 242–243). When the value
of these forms of capital is known and recognised ei-
ther in individual, everyday contexts, or collective, po-
litical contexts, they are transformed into symbolic cap-
ital, and play a role in the process of societal repro-
duction (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 17). When migrants cross
national borders, they enter a different social sphere,
where the types of capital and relations of symbolic
power are constructed differently in the various fields
that they encounter.
An individual’s cultural capital is not a static entity:
migrants create new cultural capital in their new coun-
try of residence and find ways in which to validate their
capital in the new context (Erel, 2010, pp. 649–650) or
when they negotiate its value in the local labour market
(Csedö, 2008). Migration itself also generates new cul-
tural capital for the migrant in the form of new skills, lan-
guage competence and experiences of adaptation and
learning to manage in different situations. One term
used to describe such capital gained during student mi-
gration is “mobility capital,” which has been defined as
a “sub-component of human capital, enabling individ-
uals to enhance their skills because of the richness of
the international experience gained by living abroad”
(Murphy-Lejeune, 2003, p. 51). Human capital is a con-
cept often used in, for example, economic migration re-
search and discussions on “brain drain” to describe the
total of individuals’ skills, knowledge and experiences
(e.g., Boeri, Brücker, Docquier, & Rapoport, 2012; Poot,
Waldorf, & vanWissen, 2009). In this study, however, the
Bourdieusian approach is preferred as it is more versa-
tile and offers the option of making more nuanced analy-
ses when the transnational networks and resources that
are at the migrant’s disposal are also taken into account.
Therefore, the concept of migrant capital is preferred to
that of mobility capital, which has mostly been used in
connection with student migration when describing the
added value of mobility to one’s human capital.
Social capital is the grand total of actual or poten-
tial resources that one can mobilise from one’s network,
group or collective based on solidarity (Bourdieu, 1986,
pp. 248–249). For Bourdieu these social networks are not
a natural given but must be constructed through invest-
ment strategies that aim at institutionalising group rela-
tions as a source of benefits (Portes, 1998, p. 3). Anthias
(2007) stresses that in the migration context, social cap-
ital should refer to social ties and networks that can be
mobilised. Ethnic ties may be valuable forms of capital,
but their value is often context-dependent andmembers
of these networks are at different positions in how they
may take advantage of them in pursuing social advan-
tage. Further, Wahlbeck (2018) argues that an important
analytical distinction exits between the transferability
and themobilisability of transnational social resources as
networkmembership does not automatically signify that
these ties have significant value. Nowicka (2013) con-
cludes that transnationalmigrants occupymultiple social
positions: they may be embedded in a single space, shift
between countries and transnational social spaces and
hence encounter many valorisations and conversions of
their capital. Also, Erel and Ryan (2019) note that the dy-
namic process of capital accumulation in the migration
context is multi-level and spatio-temporally contingent.
Building on this work, and that of others, I under-
stand migrant capital to consist of two interrelated as-
pects. These are the new cultural capital of a mobile
individual, i.e., the experiences, skills and competence
gained during the process of migration, and the eco-
nomic and social capital and networks that span borders
and fromwhich themobile individual can draw from and
contribute towards. How the different aspects ofmigrant
capital play out in each case is highly context-dependent
and transnational mobility can add to one’s capital in
several ways. For example, one’s economic capital can
increase via remittances sent to family members or in-
vestments into the country or origin or via earning signif-
icantly higher salaries in the country of destination. For
voluntary intra-Europeanmigrants originating from afflu-
ent, Nordic democracies, sending remittances or striving
for economic gain has not typically been the main moti-
vation formigration (e.g., Koikkalainen, 2013). Therefore,
in this article, migrant capital is discussed in reference to
cultural and social, rather than economic capital.
3. Data and Methods
This article is based on qualitative data gathered in
2018–2019 and it examines migration capital through
the case of Nordic migrants in London in a contextu-
ally and temporally sensitive manner. The aim is not
to provide a statistically representative picture of any
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one national group, but rather to learn from their ex-
periences as a group living in London during the Brexit-
fuelled uncertainty. As the Nordic people in London are
not concentrated in any single physical location, the best
place to find participants for the study was to turn to
the virtual world. Virtual ethnography is a way of do-
ing “ethnographic research in, of and through the vir-
tual” (Hine, 2000, p. 65) and by using the social net-
works that exist online. The study, therefore, began with
a small-scale virtual ethnography tracing the existence
of virtual networks and communities that unite London-
based migrants from Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway,
and Sweden. The focus was on the online services that
distribute job information and on the various virtual dis-
cussion groups andwebsites that distribute “silent knowl-
edge” about living in London. During the period of par-
ticipant observation, discussions were followed in eight
Facebook groups for Scandinavians and Nordic nationals
in London and the UK, and a number of blogs, Brexit-
related Twitter debates and online newsmedia reporting.
Then data were collected via an online survey
(N= 164) advertised in the Nordic social networks, espe-
cially Facebook and Twitter. In addition to asking mem-
bers of the Facebook groups to take part in the sur-
vey, it was also advertised through Facebook advertise-
ments. The survey included questions on the work situ-
ation, education, citizenship, partner, children, reasons
for migration, identity, international experience, positive
treatment versus discrimination, transnational ties, life
in London and thoughts about Brexit. Nine of the ques-
tions were open-ended. The method of publicising the
survey in social media had an impact on the kind of peo-
ple that took part in the survey.When participants are re-
cruited mainly via one social media platform, one needs
to be critical as to the representativeness of the sam-
ple in terms of the whole population of interest (Ignacio,
2013). While those who are active members in expatri-
ate Facebook groups are a somewhat select group, us-
ing advertising which targeted all Facebook-users with a
Nordic background located in London,was away to diver-
sify the sample when dealing with such a hard-to-reach
population (see also Pötzschke & Braun, 2017). The ex-
patriate communities of the Nordics living in London dif-
fer from each other. While the Finnish Facebook groups
tend to be active with daily discussions on diverse topics,
the groups of Swedes, Norwegians, Icelanders andDanes
are less community-like and rather focus on sharing in-
vitations about particular events or information about
companies looking for employees skilled in Scandinavian
languages, for example. This is one reason why the selec-
tion of participants is biased towards Finns, who formed
44% of all respondents of the survey. Due to the uneven
participation of people of the different Nordic national-
ities in the survey, no direct comparisons between the
countries have been made.
In addition, 15 narrative, in-depth life-historical in-
terviews were conducted with selected survey partici-
pants (aged 19 to 39 years) during a fieldwork visit to
London and via Skype. For comparative purposes, the in-
terviews were conducted following the question struc-
ture of a European research project titled YMOBILITY,
which focused on youthmigration in Europe in nine coun-
tries (e.g., King & Williams, 2018; Lulle, Moroşanu, &
King, 2018). Each data type was analysed with slightly
different methods. The online textual data, for example,
were analysed via a discursive and practice-oriented vir-
tual ethnographic approach (Hine, 2000, pp. 18–19; see
also Kozinets, 2010). The survey open-ended responses
and interview transcripts have been analysed with narra-
tive content analysis (Spencer, Ritchie, & O’Connor, 2006,
pp. 200–204) to find commonalities in the descriptions of
the research participants. To tease out the information
relevant to migrant capital, the data were analysed and
themes formed from the vantage point of how theNordic
background is visible in their daily lives and careers in
London, in their interactions with British society and in
light of the ties that still bind them to their respective
Nordic countries. In this article, the survey data and the
responses to the survey’s open-ended questions are the
primary forms of data used.
4. Nordic Migrants in Light of the Survey Data
Finns were the largest national group in the overall sur-
vey data (44%) followed by Danes (23%), Swedes (16%),
Norwegians (12%) and Icelanders (4%). There is a strong
gender bias, as 80% of all respondents were female and
only 20% male. The participants had diverse migration
backgrounds: For some the move to London had been
the only form of international mobility, while others had
lived abroad before or moved back and forth between
the UK and their country of origin. A vast majority of
the respondents were still Nordic country citizens (88%)
with the rest holding either Nordic-British, or some other
dual nationality. The overall work situation of the respon-
dents was good as 71% were in full-time employment,
while some were working part-time or as freelancers
(14%), were looking for work (4%), were studying (4%),
were engaged in care work at home (4%) or were already
retired (3%). The survey respondents were mainly highly
educated, as 68% has either a bachelor’s or a master’s
degree and 7% had a PhD degree. The rest had a profes-
sional degree (8%), were still studying (3%) or had not
completed a degree (14%).
In migration research, there are three important di-
mensions of time to consider: age at migration, length
of residence in the destination country and age (Stevens
& Ishizawa, 2013). In their study based on migrants of
different ethnic backgrounds living in Norway, Erdal and
Ezzati (2015) found that age at the time of migration and
the relative proportion of life spent in the country of ori-
gin and in the settlement country are important factors
in migrants’ considerations about settlement and return.
Also, other studies have found that a migrant’s inclusion
and the process of embedding in the country of destina-
tion changes as time passes (e.g., King &Mai, 2008; Ryan,
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2018) and as one forms closer bonds with the country
of residence.
To analyse the temporal nature of migrant capital,
the survey respondents were divided into four groups ac-
cording to the time they had lived in the UK. The groups
were: recent migrants (N = 41, in the UK for less than
two years), settled migrants (N= 41, in the UK for three
to nine years), residents (N = 47, in the UK for 10 to 19
years) and long-term residents (N = 35, in the UK for
more than 20 years).
The groups were at different stages of their life
course:While the recent and settledmigrants are in their
twenties and thirties, the residents and long-term res-
idents are in their forties and fifties. In terms of the
family situation, in each group as well as in the overall
data, those who were married or in a relationship were
the majority (68%). The proportion of singles was high-
est in the youngest group of recent migrants (41%) and
lowest in the oldest group of long-term residents (23%).
Only 10% of both migrant groups stated that they have
children, while the proportion of those with children is
much higher in both resident groups (49% and 40% re-
spectively). Key characteristics of each group are detailed
in Table 1.
In terms of primary motives for migration, the most
common one selected by the participants was for “love”
and/or “family” reasons (29% of all respondents) and to
study (27%). In addition, 26% stated that they moved pri-
marily for reasons related to work or career and 18%
for lifestyle. There was some variation in this respect
between the four groups: for the recent migrants and
residents the most important motivation was “work”
(34% and 35%), whereas for the settled migrants it was
“to study” (37%) and for the long-term residents it was
“love” and/or “family” (37%). One significant difference
between the migration experiences of these groups was
that the recent migrants moved to the UK either during
the Brexit campaign or after the June 2016 EU referen-
dum and were thus aware of the fact that their rights as
EU citizens might be at risk due to the Brexit process.
5. Cultural Capital as Migrant Capital: Skills, Cultural
Knowledge and Languages
Migration can have a positive or negative impact on one’s
cultural capital depending on how it is valued in the new
Table 1. Key characteristics of the four migrant groups.
Recent migrants
(moved in
2016–2018,
N = 41)
Settled migrants
(moved in
2009–2015,
N = 41)
Residents
(moved in
1999–2008,
N = 47)
Long-term
residents (moved
in 1998 or earlier,
N = 35)
All
respondents
(N = 164)
Country of origin
Finland 17 41% 18 44% 25 53% 12 34% 72 44%
Denmark 13 32% 9 22% 10 21% 6 17% 38 23%
Sweden 5 12% 6 15% 7 15% 9 26% 27 16%
Norway 4 10% 7 17% 3 6% 6 17% 20 12%
Iceland 2 5% 1 2% 2 4% 2 6% 7 4%
Gender
Male 29 71% 32 78% 40 85% 31 89% 132 80%
Female 12 29% 9 22% 7 15% 4 11% 32 20%
Motivation
Study 10 24% 15 37% 11 24% 9 26% 45 28%
Work 14 34% 6 15% 16 35% 7 20% 43 26%
Love, family 11 27% 13 32% 9 20% 13 37% 46 28%
Lifestyle 6 15% 7 17% 10 22% 6 17% 29 18%
Relationship
Married/relationship 23 56% 29 71% 33 70% 27 77% 112 68%
Single/other 18 44% 12 29% 14 30% 8 23% 52 32%
Children
Has children 4 10% 4 10% 23 49% 14 40% 45 27%
No children 34 83% 34 83% 21 45% 13 37% 102 62%
Skipped question 3 7% 3 7% 3 6% 8 23% 17 10%
Age
Median age group 25–29 30–34 40–44 45–49 35–39
Largest age group 20–24 30–34 40–44 45–49 30–34+ 40–44
Average age ∼29 years ∼34 years ∼42 years ∼50 years ∼38 years
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context. For example, the significance of one’s previous
work experience may not be understood, or a foreign de-
gree might not be fully recognised. In these cases, the
migrant might have to accept employment at a lower
level than before, continue studying, or look for work in
a new field (cf. Koikkalainen, 2014). The situation natu-
rally varies according to the field of employment, as pro-
fessions differ greatly in how transferable qualifications
are across borders. Yet the value of some skills, such as
cultural knowledge or competence in relatively uncom-
mon languages, may increase with migration as is evi-
dent in the survey data on Nordic migrants. Examples of
careers built on languages and cultural competence can
be found from all four groups, from recent migrants to
long-term residents.
Nordic competence can set newly arrived migrants
apart from other job applicants when there is competi-
tion over jobs. In response to what it is like to be a Nordic
migrant in London, this Norwegian respondent explains:
Easy to get a Norway-related job. As long as you have
a good understanding of the Scandinavian languages,
it is pretty easy to get into different businesses. Of
course, it is competitive but not close towhat it would
have been being British. I got a job here straight after
finishing uni[versity] here and the next job was also
another global company. (Female, age 40–45, year of
moving to London 2003)
Another quote from a recent Swedish migrant reads:
“Well...as I work in a place which contains a lot of flat
packs in my language...it has come quite handy to know
the meaning of the names of all that stuff. People do ask
about it” (Female, age 40–45, year of moving to London
2017). This also applies to Finnish, which is a member of
a different language family from the one that includes
Icelandic, Norwegian, Swedish and Danish. A settled mi-
grant from Finland explains: “I’ve gotten all my jobs so far
because I speak Finnish. This has also meant I’ve ended
up in offices with other [Northern] Europeans” (Female,
age 30–34, year of moving to London 2013).
For some migrants, the first job gained because of
one’s Nordic cultural capital was an entry-level job that
later led to other jobs that no longer relied on one’s
migration-related cultural capital. This was the case with
the Norwegian professional quoted above who has since
worked in two global companies that she thinks would
have been hard to get into had she stayed in her native
country. Yet some of the long-term residents have built
their whole career on their Nordic competence, as this
Swedish freelancer explains: “I use the Swedish language
in many of the jobs I do, for example, I teach Swedish,
I do translation work and I’m a professional tourist guide,
working mainly with visitors from Scandinavia” (Female,
age 55–59, year of moving to London 1990). In London,
a global business hub, there is demand for expertise in
the Nordic market as this Icelandic respondent explains:
“My work has involved partnering with customers in the
Nordic countries. My language skills—I speak Icelandic
and the Scandinavian languages—have been very helpful
in my professional life” (Male, age 50–54, year of moving
to London 1998).
Skills embodied in one’s habitus as a natural part of
the cultural capital gained growing up in a Nordic coun-
try can thus be an advantage in an environment in which
these skills are scarce. Migration also generates other
types of cultural capital, i.e., that related to the experi-
ences of adaptation and resilience in starting again in a
new country. The four groups examined in this article
did not differ from each other significantly in terms of
their previous international experience, but there was
considerable variation within the groups. For some, the
move to the UK was the only noteworthy form of in-
ternational experience, while others had lived, worked
or studied in several countries. An international back-
ground opens doors for further mobility and many re-
spondents reflected on the possibility of having to move
again due to Brexit. As this Danish respondent concludes:
London is a city like most other European capitals,
and I could live in either.…Before then I had worked
in Greece and Italy and didn’t feel like I had to stay
in any one place. I was fine to move wherever there
would be work. (Female, age 30–34, year of moving
to London 2016)
For many, the future was clouded in uncertainty, as the
implications of their work situation were not yet known.
A Finnish lawyer noted:
Working in the City, my career future in the UK de-
pends on how much of the City is left after Brexit.
I’m confident I’ll be permitted to stay in the UK, but
I’m not going to stay if there aren’t jobs for me. I am
in a state of permanent insecurity as to my future
due to Brexit. (Male, aged 40–44, year of moving to
London 2009)
6. Social Capital as Migrant Capital: Ties, Networks
and Resources
Migration also has an impact on one’s social capital,
because moving away adds an element of distance to
the relationship one has with family, friends and col-
leagues. However, this does not necessarily signify sever-
ing ties with one’s social networks or the different types
of resources one has access to via these connections.
Migrants send and receive money, gifts, knowledge and
care across borders via these networks and continue to
interact in the social fields that they left behind.Migrants
have several types of “transnational social positioning”
as the outcome of intersections and conversions of social
economic and cultural capital across borders, when lives
are lived in multiple locations (Nowicka, 2013, p. 31).
In the case of Nordic migrants in London, monetary
transactions across borders are not a significant form
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of interaction, because purely economic motives for mi-
gration are rare. Only two respondents among the 164
explicitly stated that money was a factor in moving to
London, and both also mentioned other aspects, such
as “gaining experience” and “having more work oppor-
tunities.” Apart from top executives or other highly-paid
professionals working in the City, the income levels af-
ter living expenses in London are not necessarily that dif-
ferent from the Nordic countries. Thus, migrating for the
purpose of sending remittances to family members or to
support schooling and care of one’s children back home
is not an issue with the Nordics. However, the continued
participation in transnational social networks is valuable
in various ways and may have an impact on one’s future
mobility choices.
When presented with a list of ten possible ways of in-
teracting with their former home country, the survey re-
spondents selected an average of six ways, themost com-
mon ones being “regular visits on holiday,” “keeping con-
tact via social media” and “reading online news.” In addi-
tion, they also keep in touchwith their Nordic culture and
fellow nationals living in London by speaking their native
language, eating Nordic food, meeting friends and host-
ing visitors from the former home country. The impor-
tance of social media networks is especially visible in the
Finnish migrant Facebook groups, through which mem-
bers regularly ask for help and information from their so-
cial network. Interestingly, identification with the Nordic
home country is high with all the four groups: 76% of
the respondents reported having a strong or very strong
identity bond to their respective countries. Perhaps un-
derlining the special nature of London as aworld city and
a migration destination, respondents in all groups had a
stronger identification with the city than with the UK in
general. “I am now even more of a Londoner and less
of a person living in the UK,” explains a Swedish respon-
dent who thinks that “London is simply the greatest city
on earth” (Male, age 45–49, year of moving to London
1997). The long-term residents, the group that has lived
in the UK for more than 20 years, has understandably
the strongest identification with their new home coun-
try, as 57% identify either strongly or very strongly with
the UK. This proportion is only 37% with the most recent
migrants, those with less than two years of experience
living in London.
Based on the answers to the open-ended questions,
Brexit is playing a key role in how the respondents saw
the possibility of social inclusion in the UK. A majority
were “absolutely gobsmacked,” felt “horrified” or were
“in shock” when they heard about the referendum result
and began to worry about what it would mean for them
as residents of the country. Formany, the result felt like a
betrayal as this Danish respondent explains: “It’s difficult
to identify with a country that is so polarised and doesn’t
want EU citizens here, hence [this is] why I will also leave
the UK” (Female, age 40–44, year of moving to London
1998). Some of the recent migrants explicitly stated that
the timing of their move was influenced by the situa-
tion, like this Finnish respondent working in the finance
industry who stated: “I did see this as a last chance to
move before Brexit” (Female, age 25–29, year of moving
to London 2017). She says that she was upset about re-
alising that “up to 52% of Brits think [she] shouldn’t be
[there].” Having completed her university degree in the
UK she is fairly settled in the social field there and has
been moving between Finland and the UK since 2010. At
the time of the survey, she was planning to leave the UK
before Brexit happens. She explains: “I used to think that
London was the greatest city on earth but now I think
that title probably goes to Berlin.”
7. Discussion
The concepts of cultural, social and economic capital are
valuable for an analysis of themigration processes in sev-
eral ways. For example, one can analyse how the mobile
individual makes the best possible use of their cultural
capital in new surroundings, interacts in the transna-
tional social space between the country of origin and
destination and gains social capital and then manages
to turn these assets into monetary form as economic
capital. Cederberg (2015, p. 46) notes that in migration
contexts, the different forms of capital are intertwined
in numerous ways as cultural capital can at times be
converted into social capital by providing access to valu-
able social resources, and embodied cultural capital is
reproduced in social networks. Together, the different
forms of capital of an individual contribute towards the
sum total of their symbolic capital, which Jenkins (2002,
p. 85) simply defines as “prestige and social honour.” The
power drawn frompossessing the right types of symbolic
capital, in turn, contributes in legitimating our social
world, as “objective relations of power tend to reproduce
themselves in relations of symbolic power” (Bourdieu,
1989, p. 21).
For Nordic migrants, the value of their cultural capi-
tal in the migration context is generally well recognised,
at least if the migrant is willing and able to utilise his
or her background effectively. Koikkalainen (2014) de-
fines three strategies thatmigrants in such situations can
adopt when looking for work and trying to get the best
possible value for their cultural capital abroad. The some-
what overlapping strategies are: simple adaptation to the
rules of the local labour market, distinction based on
one’s rare andmarketable skills and reorientation to look
for work in a new field. The Nordic migrant groups in the
UK are too small to constitute ethnic neighbourhoods or
large ethnic economies (Light & Gold, 2000) or ethnically
defined migration industries (Garapich, 2008) that pro-
vide entry-level jobs and drive further migration. Yet, for
many of the study participants, the skills and contacts
related to their Nordic background had been enough to
make them distinct enough to manoeuvre in the London
labour market.
Many survey respondents stated that they have
never felt discriminated against, they felt privileged in
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comparison with other migrant groups and could even
benefit from the fact that they are foreign. These experi-
ences are related to a Nordic stereotype or what Weinar
and Klekowski von Koppenfels (2019) call “country label”:
a set of beliefs relating to a perceived high or low status
of a particular country, what its citizens are like, andwhat
the education level in the country is. The significance of
Nordic migrants’ social capital in the migration context
lies mainly in cultural ties and the prospects for mobil-
ity in the future. There are no major transfers of mone-
tary resources at present, apart from some investing in
property abroad to secure their options to return or on-
ward migrate. Yet Nordic networks both in the UK and
in their country of origin are used as a form of everyday
transnationalism to gain information, share experiences
and teach the Nordic languages and cultural practices to
their British-born children.
Despite the status of relative privilege as a migrant
group, the uncertainty caused by the Brexit process has
already had an impact on the lives of Nordic migrants.
The four groups analysed in this article differed in their
intentions to stay in the UK. A majority in each group
thought they would stay in the UK during the next three
years, but the proportions of those likely to stay are
higher the longer the individuals had lived in the coun-
try. Fifty-one percent of the recent and 56% of the set-
tled migrants thought staying in the UK was likely, while
74% of the residents and 77% of the long-term residents
thought the same. The figures follow a similar pattern
when the respondents evaluate their life in five years’
time: Only 24% of the recent and 32% of the settled
migrants estimated that they would stay, whereas 40%
of the residents and 51% of the long-term residents
thought this was likely. Thinking about return migration
is the highest in the recent migrant group (20%) as is the
proportion of those who were unsure where they would
be living in three years’ time (20%).
8. Conclusion
The natural experiment currently underway in Europe in
the form of Brexit is an excellent case of when the macro
level (the politics of Brexit) and themicro level (the expe-
riences of intra-European migrants) should not be stud-
ied separately, but rather as interlinked processes unfold-
ing in rich and unpredictable ways. In a similar vein, Erel
and Ryan (2019, p. 249) argue that “research should look
at the formation of migrants’ capitals through the micro-
level of personal narratives, the meso-level of networks
and the macro-level of structural factors, such as chang-
ing global, national and transnational socio-economic
and political relations and conditions.” For the Nordics,
as citizens of affluent European countries with strong
market and cultural ties to the UK, the impact of positive
stereotyping and cultural trends labelled “Nordic cool” or
“Scandimania” in the British media, has created a niche
in the labour market as well as a sense of being welcome.
With the risk of engaging in methodological nationalism
(Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002) with highlighting the ex-
perience of one particular migrant group it can be stated
that Nordic migrants are generally well accepted in the
UK and able to feel that they belong to the country—or
did so at least until the uncertainty following the Brexit
referendum in 2016.
The public discourse on Brexit has led to a quasi-
nationalistic invocation of community into the social
imagination, in which in the everyday understandings of
inclusion and of decidingwho is a rightful autochthonous
member of the British society are stressed (Cassidy et al.,
2018, p. 191). In the narratives of the residents and long-
term residents, who have lived in the UK for decades,
many go along with this pressure and talk of their con-
tributions for the benefit of the UK, such as paying taxes
and raising new British citizens, thanks to which they
should be entitled to belong. Like this Danish respon-
dent explains:
Brexiteers have told me to shut up and go home to
my own country as the issue of Brexit is only to be
discussed and decided by British people….Ever since
I came to the UK I have worked and paid taxes, but
now I am not allowed an opinion about the future of
the UK? (Male, Danish, age 50–54, year of moving to
London 2007)
For the recent migrants and settled migrants, the idea
of not being welcome is perhaps less heart-breaking and
many have stated that they sympathise with the British
people who have nowhere to go if the country ends up
in chaos. In the words of another Danish migrant: “I was
worried how it was going to affect my rights in the UK.
But actually, I felt even more sorry for the Brits and the
unsettling situation they are finding themselves in now”
(Female, age 20–24, year of moving to London 2016).
Because the scope of this article does not allow for
a comparison with other migrant groups, it is difficult
to say what, if anything, is unique to the experience of
Nordic migrants in London. Examining how the changing
situation is experienced by other nationalities in London
would add to our understanding of how other variables,
such as education levels, employment sectors, race and
class have an impact on how Brexit is perceived and how
migrant capital is useful for life in a global city. For the
Nordic migrants living in London, migrant capital con-
sists first and foremost of cultural and social capital. For
them, the Nordic background is valuable thanks to the
cultural capital embodied in their habitus as well as the
social capital available via the Nordic networks in UK and
transnationally. Both these aspects are present regard-
less of how long the migrant has been living in the UK,
even though a longer stay in the country signifies more
attachment and ties in the UK. Thus, their migrant cap-
ital it is beneficial in terms of achieving social inclusion
both in the UK and as a way of possibly migrating abroad
if Brexit makes life too difficult for Nordic migrants in
the UK.
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